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A large fraction of total healthcare expenditure occurs due to end-of-life (EOL) care, which means it is important to study the problem of more carefully incentivizing necessary versus unnecessary EOL care because this has the potential to reduce overall healthcare spending. This paper introduces a principal-agent model that integrates a mixed payment system of fee-for-service and pay-for-performance in order to analyze whether it is possible to better align healthcare provider incentives with patient outcomes and cost-efficiency in EOL care. The primary contributions are to derive optimal contracts for EOL care payments using a principal-agent framework under three separate models for the healthcare provider, where each model considers a different level of risk tolerance for the provider. We derive these optimal contracts by converting the underlying principal-agent models from a bilevel optimization problem into a single-level optimization problem that can be analytically solved. Our results are demonstrated using a simulation where an optimal contract is used to price intracranial pressure monitoring for traumatic brain injuries.